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Abstract 
This article examines an attempt to reconstitute global development governance in a context 
of growing influence for private finance. We focus on the World Bank’s Human Capital 
Project (HCP) and Human Capital Index (HCI), which have stated aims of promoting 
economic growth and accelerating progress towards achievement of the Sustainable 
Development Goals. Informed by a review of publicly available World Bank materials, we 
argue that, through its HCP and HCI, the World Bank is responding to its own institutional 
side-lining in development financing and governance with a strategy of reintermediation. Its 
leaders have pursued a system of governance in which the World Bank creates and 
instrumentalises knowledge on human capital – an asset to be accumulated through judicious 
investments in markets for self-betterment. Through its HCI the World Bank has expanded its 
global benchmarking practices, encompassing new domains and quantified predictions of 
future productivity, in the hope of shaping domestic policy processes. Its leaders propose to 
use HCI scores to signal risk to investors and political leaders, triggering political shocks that 
will spur policy reform. Crucially, these efforts seek to reassert the World Bank’s epistemic 
authority and financing clout as the influence of its own lending wanes.  
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Global development governance is undergoing important institutional shifts as we progress 
further into the era of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) (Horner and Hulme 2019). 
One area of change is an expansion in the modalities and sources of financing for 
development (World Bank and International Monetary Fund 2015), which presents a 
challenge for many of the organisations that have dominated development and its financing 
since the mid-20th century, the Bretton Woods institutions perhaps more so than any others 
(Güven 2017). Here we consider activities by the World Bank that respond to this shifting 
institutional landscape. 
With annual commitments of USD 67 billion in 2018 (World Bank 2018a), the World Bank 
remains amongst the largest and most influential of the established development financing 
institutions. Since its inception in 1944 the Bank has served as a key mediator for sovereign-
backed financial capital, mobilising finance to countries to (re)build infrastructure and 
stabilise markets. The 1980s and 1990s marked a zenith for World Bank influence in 
development, when its central mediating role between cash-poor governments and financial 
capital provided significant influence over domestic social policy agendas in those countries 
(Gavin and Rodrik 1995). Ideas and practices that dominate within the institution have 
become embedded in domestic policy-making and have displaced the historical emphasis on 
achieving reforms through conditionalities on financing (Sondarjee 2021). The organisation 
has out-muscled United Nations (UN) organisations in areas such as education (Mundy and 
Verger 2015) and health (Brown, Cueto, and Fee 2006) with its unmatched ability to mobilise 
financial and technical resources and its central role in epistemic communities supporting 
market-oriented policy reform (Goldman 2005). Its status as a 'Knowledge Bank’ has been 
cemented by the technical guidance and policy interventions that are routinely generated and 
disseminated through its Washington-based policy units and network of country offices 
(Marshall 2008), but has remained limited in scope and impact (Ravallion 2016). Indeed the 
extent of influence for the organisation in domestic policy-making been subject to scepticism 
for some time (Hunter and Brown 2000; Harrigan, El-Said, and Wang 2006; Kirk 2010), 
including from the Bank’s own Independent Evaluation Group (2011). 
The World Bank’s role as global mediator of sovereign credit now faces challenges from 
several quarters (Güven 2017), resulting in what some have called a crisis of relevance and 
credibility (Kersting and Kilby 2018; Behar 2012). Private financial capital is of particular 
importance because it is touted as necessary in a global context where ‘traditional’ forms of 
development financing are considered by many to be inadequate for achieving the ambitions 
of the SDGs (World Bank and International Monetary Fund 2015; United Nations 2019). For 
its part, the World Bank has been at the forefront of these calls (Gabor 2021), for example 
advocating a ‘cascade’ approach in which public financing is to be a last resort once various 
mechanisms to attract and encourage private finance have been exhausted (World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund 2015). In this scenario, the challenge faced by the Bank has 
been how to retain its position as a central authority for global development in the face of a 





We focus on one component of the World Bank’s contemporary development apparatus that 
appears to respond to this dilemma: its Human Capital Project (HCP). The HCP was 
launched in 2017 with the stated aim of promoting economic growth and accelerating 
progress towards achievement of the SDG targets for eliminating extreme poverty, reducing 
stunting and child and premature adult mortality, and improving access to quality education 
(International Monetary Fund and World Bank 2018). By September 2020, 78 countries had 
signed up to be part of the HCP (World Bank 2020c), and yet to date there has been limited 
detailed examination on the implications for development governance of the design and 
articulation of the HCP. Yarrow’s recent analysis considers the HCP to be illustrative of 
broader trends in human capital accounting, in ways that de-legitimise non-market 
institutions (2020). Otherwise, critique has been limited to sector-specific examination that 
questions the effects on health equity of the HCP’s economistic underpinnings (Stein and 
Sridhar 2019), or analyses of one particular component in the HCP – the Human Capital 
Index (HCI).  
Launched at the 2018 Human Capital Summit, the HCI ranks countries according to a set of 
indicators for health and education. Technical critiques of the HCI have questioned the 
validity of the education quality measure, which uses the results from several multi-country 
testing programmes such as the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) (Liu and Steiner-Khamsi 
2020). Commentators also question the assumption that these tests are an accurate proxy for 
learning (Liu 2018). Others have posed the question of why an additional index was 
necessary alongside those already produced by the Institute for Health Metrics and 
Evaluation (Tichenor and Sridhar 2019) and United Nations Development Programme 
(Ministry of Finance of India 2018). Indeed the World Economic Forum has for several years 
produced its own Global Human Capital Index (World Economic Forum 2017). The stated 
position of the World Bank is that its HCI is needed because, unlike other indices, it will 
explicitly quantify the contribution of incomplete education and poor health to the lack of 
productivity of the future labour-force, in order to incentivise finance ministers to take 
immediate corrective action (International Monetary Fund and World Bank 2018, 3).  
Here we argue the HCP and HCI represent an attempt by World Bank leadership to reassert 
the organisation’s position as arbiter of knowledge and capital in global development 
governance through the Bank’s mastery of human capital, both in terms of measurement and 
enhancement, and its concomitant signalling of risk to investors and governments. Our 
findings are informed by a review of 61 texts that have been published by the World Bank, or 
authored by managers at the Bank, and that include reports, working papers, speeches, and 
academic or press media articles (see Appendix 1 for a list of materials reviewed). Although 
the International Monetary Fund is co-listed on two key oversight documents for the HCP 
(International Monetary Fund and World Bank 2018; 2019), it appears to occupy a peripheral 
role in the project. Materials were obtained during June 2019 through a search using key 
terms such as ‘human capital project’ and ‘human capital index’, in the Google search engine 
and on the World Bank organisational website, and the search was repeated in March 2021. 





Our analysis of the retrieved materials has been informed by social science literatures which 
we outline in the next section on benchmarking in global governance, reintermediation in 
finance, and risk. Through the HCP and HCI, the World Bank extends its benchmarking 
practices into new areas of public policy, accommodating a predilection for private capital 
flows with its own territorial concerns in policy domains such as health and education. In the 
subsequent section we introduce an underlying conceptual shift, from social capital to human 
capital: a framework that implores households and individuals to manage social risks by 
investing in markets for self-betterment and reinforces the Bank’s claims to expertise in 
social policy. This is illustrated with examples from HCP documents. We then turn to the 
HCI and its benchmarking processes that aim to predict future productivity and incentivise 
government support for human capital investments by fusing aggregate population data 
points with econometric studies on the effects of health and education on individual earnings. 
In the penultimate section we draw attention to an envisaged process for achieving domestic 
policy reforms that World Bank leaders have openly aspired towards and that entails HCI-
induced financial and political shocks. The World Bank uses its quantified predictions for 
future productivity, in spite of the uncertainties they entail, to imbue in governments a 
heightened sense of financial and political risk that can augment the Bank’s leverage over 
nation states. In the final section we conclude with a reflection on areas for further 
investigation. 
 
Benchmarking, reintermediation and risk 
Benchmarking has been a notable feature of global governance in the 21st century, as 
organisations deploy audits, rankings, indicators, indexes, baselines and targets as 
instruments for the comparative evaluation of actors and institutions (Broome and Quirk 
2015). This has in turn prompted a body of critique in which the World Bank and its Doing 
Business analysis features prominently but not alone; other examples include the OECD’s 
FDI Regulatory Restrictiveness Index (Broome, Homolar, and Kranke 2018), World 
Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Reports (Fougner 2008), Freedom House’s 
Freedom in the World (Bush 2017), and US Government’s Trafficking in Persons Report 
(Kelley and Simmons 2015). In the study of development, examples include the UN’s Human 
Development Index (HDI) (Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012b) and Millennium 
Development Goals (MDG) and SDGs (Clegg 2015; Fukuda‐Parr and McNeill 2019; Ziai 
2011), the World Bank’s Country Policy and Institutional Assessments and g7+’s Fragility 
Assessment (Rocha De Siqueira 2014), and the World Health Organization’s ill-judged 
ranking of healthcare systems in the 2000 World Health Report (Navarro 2000; Ollila and 
Koivusalo 2002). The World Bank’s Doing Business rankings – which assess legal 
frameworks, rules and regulations relating to business operations – have been subject to the 
most systematic examination and critique by scholars pointing to neoliberal normative values 
and standards, systemic problems of reductionism, and the exaggeration of difference (Berg 





Willumsen 2012; Lee, McCann, and Torm 2008; Broome, Homolar, and Kranke 2018; Davis, 
Kingsbury, and Merry 2012b; Scheuth 2015). 
Here we highlight two pertinent themes from the global benchmarking literature. First, 
organisations use their rankings and benchmarks to make claims on knowledge and cultivate 
epistemic authority in specific aspects of development. Organisations use benchmarking to 
‘flag-plant’ an area of knowledge and assert their position as arbiters of relevant information 
(Cooley 2015, 21). Their activity ‘delineates the boundaries of rational and correct conduct’ 
(Löwenheim 2008, 260), such that ‘unmediated subjective data’ is displaced (Davis, 
Kingsbury, and Merry 2012a, 18), and authority shifts to mediated forms of information 
gathering – the quantified global indicators produced by these third parties. The credibility of 
benchmarking systems stems from the reputation of the third parties involved: locations, 
histories, resources and perceived independence from political influence (Kelley and 
Simmons 2019). In order to protect the legitimacy of their constructs, creators release 
detailed methodological descriptions and defensive arguments, and may avoid statements 
indicating overt political or economic pressure on subjects. Legitimacy is further enhanced 
through endorsements by renowned academic institutions and ‘experts’ (Fougner 2008), and 
when the construct is taken up by other organisations for inclusion in their indices and 
decision-making (Löwenheim 2008, 263). It is noticeable that organisations from the ‘Global 
North’, and in particular those based in the USA, predominate as creators of benchmarking 
systems: ‘the authority to define the game and to keep score rather firmly resides with 
existing centers of global power’ (Kelley and Simmons 2019, 505). 
Second, benchmarking can engender change in policy and practice. Although couched in 
seemingly neutral, technocratic labels and terminology, their design and use reflects 
underlying normative agendas and a set of policy standards to which the subjects of 
benchmarking are expected to conform. Through their indicators, ratings and rankings, 
organisations engage in the ‘quiet’ (Merry, Davis, and Kingsbury 2015), and ‘indirect’ 
(Broome, Homolar, and Kranke 2018), power relations of governmentality (Cooley 2015; 
Löwenheim 2008; Fougner 2008). Benchmarking operates as a ‘technology of global 
governance’ (Davis, Kingsbury, and Merry 2012b), in which ‘social pressure’ (applied 
domestically and internationally) to achieve improved scores and rankings (Doshi, Kelley, 
and Simmons 2019; Kelley and Simmons 2015) leads subjects to embed particular ideas and 
ways of working within policy processes (Kelley and Simmons 2019), in some cases 
stimulating policy reform (Honig and Weaver 2019). However, scores are only one 
consideration amongst many in policy processes operating within a wider global political 
economy and the considerations that it brings (Sending and Lie 2015; Besley 2015; Davis, 
Kingsbury, and Merry 2012a; Baumann 2017). While some subjects respond affirmatively to 
benchmarking, even seeking to game the measurements and subvert the benchmarking 
process to obtain sympathetic scores (Harrison and Sekalala 2015), others opt to reject or 
contest scores, publicly or in private (Löwenheim 2008; Doshi, Kelley, and Simmons 2019). 
In a global context where poles of influence are shifting and where the organisations which 





from other sources, we consider benchmarking to offer a mechanism for institutional 
reintermediation. The concept of reintermediation has typically been used in the study of 
finance to describe the changing role and composition of intermediaries in credit relations. 
That literature analyses what was initially referred to as a process of disintermediation 
(Sinclair 1994), as the sourcing of credit shifted from bank loans to capital markets, reducing 
the traditional role of a bank as intermediary between the deposits of savers and the loans of 
borrowers (Scholtens and van Wensveen 2000), although subsequent analyses have 
questioned some of the empirical evidence supporting this narrative (Schmidt, Hackethal, and 
Tyrell 1999). Commentators have since adopted a broader concept of reintermediation to 
describe the shifting forms that intermediation takes, as financial intermediaries are varyingly 
displaced and replaced by alternative intermediaries (French and Leyshon 2004), and adopt 
new roles themselves. Reintermediation provides a lens through which to view new strategies 
and activities that preserve influence in a shifting institutional landscape; in this case how the 
World Bank deploys benchmarking and notions of risk as devices to pursue reintermediation 
in global development. 
Risk is a concept that straddles literature on benchmarking and financial reintermediation. 
Risk in the social science literature has been explored by Beck through his study of the ‘risk 
society’ – a regime of reflexive modernity in which knowledge, science, and politics are all 
driven by the collective fear of the uncertain (Beck 1992); through processes of cultural 
construction of sacred/profane and good/evil binaries in different cultural milieus (Douglas 
1990; Douglas, Thompson, and Verweij 2003); and through the Foucauldian approach of 
governmentality, which seeks to identify practices inherent in creating knowledge about how 
risks and threats should be collectively and individually managed (Burchell, Gordon, and 
Miller 1991). Although the concept has been productively applied in the study of 
development, in areas such as poverty (Best 2013), and security (Frith and Glenn 2015), it is 
in the study of finance that the concept of risk has been most illuminating. In this sector, risk 
is a concern to be quantified, managed and traded, part of a changing landscape in which 
information and transactions are constantly ‘dispersed, displaced, collapsed and reworked in 
space and time’ (French and Leyshon 2004, 283), inspiring new products and services to 
facilitate these processes, and new actors to organise them.  
Credit ratings agencies are one such set of actors concerned with risk, benchmarking and 
finance, and later in the article we discuss their role in the World Bank’s HCP. In contexts of 
significant political and economic uncertainty, ratings agencies organise and instrumentalise 
vast amounts of information into a set of scores that can then be aggregated into a readily 
interpretable overall rating. Poon has noted how for ratings agencies ‘the original meaning of 
“rating” as an endorsement has collapsed with a technical conception of “risk” as a verifiable 
prediction’ (Poon 2012, 14, our emphasis), such that the uncertainty of loan repayment is 
transformed into quantifiable risk within certain institutional environments in order to price 
and manipulate those risks (Guseva and Rona-Tas 2001). This brings new sets of 
epistemological assumptions about the calculability and predictability of the future 
(Besedovsky 2018). Credit rating agencies have an interest in misrepresenting ‘idiosyncratic 





used to signal creditworthiness to interested parties as the basis for investment judgements. It 
is this influential mediating role that has led credit rating agencies to be described by some as 
the ‘new masters of capital’ (Sinclair 2005). The blending of risk, benchmarking and 
reintermediation which fuelled the rise of credit ratings agencies in global finance is now 
being reproduced by the World Bank in global development governance, through its pivot 
into human capital programming and the HCP.  
 
From social capital to human capital 
Use of human capital as the central theme for the HCP marks a departure for the World Bank, 
from previous concerns with another embodiment of capital: social capital. Social capital was 
first systematically described within the academic discipline of sociology, by Pierre 
Bourdieu, but has come to take on particular theoretical and empirical significance within 
political science and economics (Dasgupta and Serageldin 2000, 3). The concept has been 
applied by scholars in a variety of ways, for example to explain how actors exploit 
information flows within the structure of social networks (Burt 1992), and features of 
functional democracies and communities (Putnam 1995). Despite these different approaches 
and empirical focuses, we can discern a general consensus that social capital reflects ‘the 
ability of actors to secure benefits by virtue of membership in social networks or other social 
structures’ (Portes 1998, 6). 
Within the World Bank, the debates about social capital and its policy uses have swirled. 
Robert Putnam’s work was first taken up by the Bank in the early 1990s and later took off 
more widely throughout the institution culminating in the formation of a Social Capital 
Initiative, which sought to define, measure and evaluate social capital in development 
(Grootaert and Van Bastelar 2002). Nonetheless use of the concept within the World Bank 
remained limited in scope and failed to challenge the organisation’s methodological 
individualism and aversion to class, power and redistribution in policy and lending practices 
(Bebbington et al. 2004; Harriss 2002). The concept has noticeably since faded from much of 
the World Bank’s materials, with one notable exception being a cursory mention in the 2019 
World Development Report: a claim that human capital ‘fosters’ social capital, and that the 
latter leads to economic growth (World Bank 2019j, 51). 
Through the HCP, the World Bank has instead reinvigorated the concept of ‘human capital’: 
an intellectual framework and policy-making approach that has both supported and produced 
new modes of capitalist governance while also provoking intense criticism based on its 
political and epistemological assumptions. ‘Human capital’ as an academic concept was first 
advanced in the economics literature by University of Chicago economist Theodore Schultz 
in the early 1960s and was later popularised and extended by another Chicago economist, 
Gary Becker (Schultz 1961; Becker 1993). The concept broadens the scope of capital to 
include humans and their education and skills, and has been propagated within the World 





human capital accounting (Yarrow 2020). Usefully summarised by Tan (2014, 436), the 
concept has been criticised on a number of fronts, based on its: 
definition of human being (utility-driven animal); the description of human being 
(self-interested and rational homo economicus); its prescriptive nature (governable 
and stimuli-response puppets who alter their behaviour in response to the 
modification in environmental variables); and lastly due to the terminological shift 
that it has brought (the labour itself is a form of a capitalist enterprise).  
The transition from the sociologically complex, operationally difficult and contested notion 
of social capital, to a quantitatively simpler (if still politically contested) idea of human 
capital is important. The transformation of the human condition into human capital permits 
the language of investment to be applied to populations and individuals, just as it is to any 
other factor of production in an economic process. Human capital is conceptualised as an 
asset to be accumulated at the individual level through judicious investments in markets for 
self-betterment.  
The ideas and policies laid out in HCP documents lend weight to this while bolstering the 
‘Knowledge Bank’ claims of the World Bank. Policies favoured in the HCP’s ‘menu’ (World 
Bank 2018d, 16) for human capital interventions encourage investment in market-based 
systems of incentives and disincentives that will facilitate utility maximisation for individuals 
and households. Conditional cash transfers stand out as receiving particular attention as a 
claimed successful policy intervention (World Bank 2019f; 2019c; 2019d; 2020d; 2020e; 
2019g; 2020b; 2019i), continuing support for an approach that has been favoured by the 
World Bank for integrating the poor into market-based systems for social protection (Best 
2013), and social reproduction (Ruckert 2010). HCP documents highlight the apparent 
success of consumption taxes on tobacco and sugary drinks (Kim 2018b; World Bank 2018d; 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank 2018; World Bank 2019b; El-Saharty et al. 
2020), bursaries or fee waivers to participate in private education markets (International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank 2018; World Bank 2018d; 2019e), and health insurance that 
will permit similar participation in private healthcare markets (Kim 2018b; World Bank 
2020b; Blunch 2020; World Bank 2019b). 
The model for human capital enhancement encouraged by the HCP appears to be one of 
neoliberal responsibilisation – the production of individual subjectivities for obligatory self-
care and improvement (Rose 2001; Trnka and Trundle 2014). The notion of 
responsibilisation comes from observations that late capitalist market economies tend to 
reshape peoples’ understanding of their own individual and collective responsibility for 
others. Trnka and Trundle (2014, 137) note how it is bound up with social and political forms 
of neoliberalism: ‘a set of ideals and practices that involve a shrinking state mandate, 
deregulation and privatisation, a faith in markets to govern social life, and an increased 
emphasis on personal choice and freedom’. This kind of neoliberal responsibilisation has for 
some time been fostered amongst governmental and non-governmental organisations through 





The HCP now presses for policies that encourage responsibilisation amongst individuals and 
households and is steeped in an explicit assumption ‘that households themselves produce 
human capital and are the ones making the decisions about investments in human capital’ 
(World Bank 2020a). A presentation on the Africa Human Capital Plan picks out ‘behavioral 
sciences’ approaches as ‘an opportunity to maximise the impact of investments by focusing 
on how people make decisions’ in areas such as education, agriculture and intra-household 
relations (World Bank 2019a, 45), while other documents including the Middle East and 
North Africa Human Capital Plan and a subsequent book on human capital formation in the 
region refer specifically to opportunities for ‘nudging’ (World Bank 2019h; El-Saharty et al. 
2020). Singapore has been commended for adopting individual savings accounts that citizens 
use to save for and purchase some healthcare services, fostering ‘responsibility for their own 
welfare’ (World Bank 2020e, 74), and the World Bank’s Lead Economist for Malaysia 
suggested that entire social welfare systems be redesigned to ensure appropriate 
responsibilisation: ‘Malaysia’s current social protection system could be both expanded and 
reformed to integrate a mixture of mandates and incentives, thereby helping households 
better invest in human capital’ (Record 2019). The use of global benchmarking for 
responsibilisation of the nation-state has previously been the subject of critique (Baumann 
2017; Merry 2011), but the HCP goes further by instilling responsibilisation across scales – 
producing at multiple levels what Ilcan and Phillips (2010, 847) defined in relation to the 
MDGs as ‘responsible development subjects’. By seeking to devolve responsibility for 
human capital investment to households and individuals, the HCP burdens them with the 
labour costs of sourcing adequate nutrition, schooling and healthcare in market-based systems 
for provisioning, and shifts attention further away from wider problems in national and global 
political economies.  
Market-based responsibilisation is projected into the future for ‘the next generation of 
workers’ (International Monetary Fund and World Bank 2018, 3) as the HCP seeks to 
legitimise a precaritisation of work that has been encouraged for some time through another 
World Bank initiative – Doing Business. The launch of the HCP accompanied growing World 
Bank interest in the automation of industrial work and declining rates of job creation, notably 
featured in the Bank’s 2019 World Development Report, The Changing Nature of Work 
(World Bank 2019j). Jim Yong Kim, World Bank President when the HCP was developed 
and launched, highlighted the importance of expanding human capital in response to these 
challenges (Kim 2018a; Council on Foreign Relations 2018), while continuing to emphasise 
the need for governments to maintain and increase national ‘competitiveness’ in a shifting 
global economy (Kim 2018b; World Bank 2018d). A key part of this strategy is a push 
towards promoting a set of skills that are varyingly described as ‘sociobehavioral’ (World 
Bank 2018c, 14), or ‘socioemotional’ (Kim 2018b, 93), and which include grit, 
conscientiousness, teamwork, empathy, conflict resolution, and relationship management. At 
first glance the value attached to such skills is commendable, but it sits uneasily with an HCI 
benchmarking system (see next section) which judges national educational attainment 
according to standardised tests that focus on achievement in mathematics and literacy and 
which provides little incentive to devote time for the development of sociobehavioral skills. 





global economy these skills map onto the fetishised capacities necessary for the emotional 
labour, control, and pliability of a workforce in a global ‘gig’ economy (Gandini 2019); 
logics which are impressed upon domestic politics by the HCI. 
 
Predictive benchmarking 
World Bank materials assert that governments have, for various political and economic 
reasons, failed to prioritise spending for social sectors such as healthcare and education. 
Documents repeatedly mention the counter-productive short time-horizons for politicians 
who seek demonstrable benefits within an election cycle and lack incentives to support 
longer-term development of human capital (Kraay 2018, 2). This overlooks the pressures 
placed on national governments to maintain ‘competitiveness’ through global labour arbitrage 
and preferential tax regimes which undermine the labour rights that can protect health and 
wellbeing, and the domestic resource mobilisation that can fund education and healthcare. By 
painting a picture of political and social myopia, the documents re-assert old tropes that 
blame resource-constrained governments for failing to ‘invest’ appropriately, while 
obfuscating a global political economy that prioritises predatory forms of investment over 
basic needs.  
The HCI is designed to overcome the claimed aversion of governments to human capital 
investment by demonstrating the effect of poor education and ill-health on economic 
productivity. Lost productivity is described in terms of ‘human capital gaps’ that represent 
the difference between the expected long-term implications of current health and education 
standards, and a ‘frontier’ scenario of complete education and full health. While project 
documents do note the intrinsic importance of health and education, they also assert that such 
values are difficult to quantify and therefore emphasis must be placed on understanding these 
as factors of human capital for economic production (Kraay 2019). As one World Bank 
report notes, the deaths of children ‘are not just a tragedy, but also a loss of their human 
capital, which never is realized’ (World Bank 2018c, 20). 
The HCI follows, and is inspired by, longer-standing benchmarking systems introduced by 
the World Bank. Its Worldwide Governance Indicators (1996–) and Doing Business rankings 
(2003–) marked new approaches by the World Bank for seeking policy reform through 
measurement. In the case of the latter, the Bank cited other global benchmarking systems, 
produced by Freedom House, Heritage Foundation, the World Economic Forum and UNDP, 
as inspiration for its own ranking of nations (World Bank 2003). In turn the perceived success 
of the Doing Business rankings in driving domestic policy reforms appears to have been 
influential in the design of the HCI: Jim Yong Kim noted as much when claiming how the 
Doing Business rankings had ‘inspired’ 3,180 domestic regulatory reforms and explaining 






A detailed design and justification for the HCI has been published by the Bank’s Deputy 
Chief Economist (Kraay 2018), in one of several technical documents that underscore the 
Bank’s epistemic authority with regards to human capital, its measurement and its 
relationship with economic growth (Flabbi and Gatti 2018; World Bank 2020d; 2020a; Gatti 
and Mohpal 2019; Angrist et al. 2019; Collin and Weil 2018). In brief, the HCI is constructed 
from three components, themselves aggregate measures for dimensions of social life: health, 
expected learning-adjusted years of school, and child survival (see Table 1 for a breakdown 
of indicators and benchmarks used in the HCI). After a process comparing indicators to 
benchmark scores, and then adjusting them using factors that represent the economic 
‘returns’ from investments in health and in education, scores for the three components are 
multiplied together to produce a country score between 0 and 1, where a score of 1 indicates 
full ‘productivity’ for the working population in the future. While much of the documentation 
surrounding the HCP refers to a broad concept of population productivity, the formulae used 
in the HCI rely on a somewhat narrower gauge: average incremental effects of health and of 
education on individual earnings, based on Bank reviews of econometric research.  
[Insert Table 1 around here] 
The first HCI ranking was released in 2018, reportedly after just three months of preparation 
(Dhanani 2020): 157 countries were ranked and 61 countries scored 0.5 or lower, indicating 
that labour-force productivity in 18 years’ time would be 50% lower than if there was 
complete education and full health in these countries. While Singapore was presented as a 
world leader that is tracking close to its frontier line, countries in sub-Saharan Africa and 
South Asia were laggards, losing half or more of future workforce productivity due to poor 
education and ill-health, although the HCI avoids the overtly pejorative labels used in some 
other indices (Cooley 2015, 16). In early 2020 the World Bank then published HCI scores for 
a subset of countries disaggregated by socioeconomic status and location (World Bank 
2020d), followed by a second iteration of the index in September 2020 (World Bank 2020e). 
The updated HCI included data from 174 countries – 17 more countries than the 2018 
iteration – and disaggregated data. The update also introduced two new Utilization-Adjusted 
Human Capital Indices (UHCI) which are offered as a complement to the HCI by calculating 
the extent to which human capital will be under-utilised in the future economy, for example 
due to unemployment (Pennings 2020). Notably, in the 2020 iteration the Bank did not rank 
countries based on HCI scores as it had done in 2018 – a point we return to later. 
In many ways the design of the HCI is similar to other benchmarking systems based on 
development indicators, such as the Human Development Index, the MDGs and the SDGs. 
But in the case of the HCI, calculation takes place across time-horizons – it produces 
‘imagined futures’ for economic activity (Beckert 2016), turning incalculable uncertainties 
into quantified risks through the World Bank’s own ‘algorithmic configurations’ (Callon and 
Muniesa 2005, 1240). The measurement of population futures and predictions for 
productivity (or rather earnings) are held as justification for human capital investments in the 
present. Poor current indicators for education and health feed into an imagined future 





failure to adequately resource the next generation of workers during their childhood. That 
scenario is juxtaposed with an alternative vision of a thriving economy and skilled and 
healthy workforce: 
If a country’s children grow up unable to meet the needs of the future workplace, that 
country will find itself incapable of employing its people, unable to increase its 
output, and utterly unprepared to compete economically […] If we act with a fierce 
sense of urgency, we can create a world where all children arrive at school well-
nourished and ready to learn; where they have a chance to grow up and become 
healthy, skilled adults; and where they can be productive throughout their careers as 
they reach for their own aspirations. That’s the world we want. This index can help 
get us there (Kim 2018c). 
While other global benchmarking systems make claims to describe the present state of the 
world, the HCI projects its future and positions the World Bank as oracle and arbiter for 
identifying, quantifying and managing the risks involved. 
 
Shocks, risks and policy reforms 
In contrast to the ‘quiet’ relations of governmentality produced by other benchmarking 
systems (Merry, Davis, and Kingsbury 2015), the HCI is conspicuously loud. The World 
Bank’s official HCP documents employ the idea of reputational and financial ‘shocks’ as a 
primary mechanism for inducing policy reform following poor results in global ranking 
systems (World Bank 2018c; International Monetary Fund and World Bank 2018; Kim 
2018b). They repeatedly cite a 2001 ‘PISA Shock’ in Germany, where poor performance in 
the OECD’s PISA ranking system led to a public outcry and stimulated reforms in the 
education sector. Jim Yong Kim was particularly outspoken regarding his hopes of analogous 
HCI shocks. In a 2017 speech at Harvard University, Kim noted: ‘We have to first create an 
environment where it’s inevitable that they [politicians] will invest in people […] I feel I 
have a moral responsibility to reveal to leaders and ministers of finance that if they don’t 
invest in their people they’re going to be in big trouble’ (Shaffer 2018). The following year, 
at a Council on Foreign Relations event (2018), Kim was blunter, disparaging finance 
ministers who ‘typically spend more time worrying about their country’s stock of debt than 
its stock of human capital’, and outlining hopes for fomenting disorder as a mechanism to 
achieve policy reforms: ‘I look forward for the day when the ranking comes out. I hope heads 
of state and ministers of finance come to me and say, hey, you know, there’s chaos back 
home because we came out so low on the ranking; what will it take to improve my ranking?’ 
Kim foresaw a chain of events through which low HCI scores would weaken perceived 
creditworthiness and culminate in policy reforms:  
if an unexpectedly low rating on the human capital index leads to, you know, a 
change in your sovereign bond rating, and all of a sudden your overnight borrowing 





saying why haven’t you invested more in people, then I think finally we’ll be at a 
point where people will take these investments, like girls’ education, seriously enough 
(Council on Foreign Relations 2018). 
Documents indicate attempts to incorporate HCI scores into rankings and ratings produced by 
other organisations, which would allow the World Bank to leverage the financial resources of 
those organisations to exert pressure on countries to adopt reforms, although at the time of 
writing these attempts appear to have been largely unsuccessful. For example, in his Council 
on Foreign Relations speech, Kim suggested HCI scores might drive reform if they are 
incorporated into annual Article IV consultations between the International Monetary Fund 
and governments (Council on Foreign Relations 2018). In reports prepared for recent Article 
IV consultations (see Nigeria for example) (IMF 2020), the IMF has indeed included figures 
comparing national HCI scores to regional averages and global trends as background 
information, but beyond that there is no indication of detailed discussion relating to human 
capital and the HCI.  
Credit ratings companies too have been called upon to incorporate HCI scores into their 
sovereign credit rating systems (Council on Foreign Relations 2018). Poor performance in the 
HCI is to be interpreted as a sign of poor creditworthiness, leading to higher borrowing costs 
for governments and in turn driving policy change. The World Bank’s list of ‘Human Capital 
Champions’ has included Doug Peterson, CEO of S&P, suggesting some collaboration in this 
area (World Bank 2018b), however there have been no formal announcements to date to 
indicate credit ratings agencies have used HCI scores to inform their ratings systems, 
although the opacity of credit ratings systems precludes certainty on HCI scores being used in 
this way.  
The response of national governments too has been mixed. Hopes of a ‘HCI shock’ following 
the first iteration of the HCI were dashed when it was met with criticism from several 
governments. The Indian national government responded to its low HCI score by publishing a 
press release stating it would ‘ignore’ the HCI (Ministry of Finance of India 2018), and 
countries in the G-24 used a press conference to express concerns with the approach to 
measuring and ranking countries (Igoe 2018). However by the time the second iteration was 
published in 2020, 78 countries had joined the HCP, with several holding Human Capital 
Summits, working group meetings and featuring human capital within national development 
plans (International Monetary Fund and World Bank 2019; World Bank 2020b). The 
response of governments to the second iteration of the HCI was noticeably more muted than 
the reaction to the 2018 HCI, although the attention devoted to the COVID-19 pandemic may 
go some way to explaining this. 
In an apparent departure from Kim’s support for national HCI rankings, and indicating an 
area of debate within the World Bank (analogous perhaps to debates over the 
conceptualization of social capital within the Bank) (Bebbington et al. 2004), the national 
rankings (but not scores) that had drawn such disapproval in 2018 were removed from the 
2020 update. Jim Yong Kim had abruptly stepped down as World Bank President in January 





although the HCP remains a central project within the World Bank, Kim’s successor David 
Malpass has been noticeably less vocal and combative on the HCP and its HCI. The removal 
of national rankings was reportedly due to concerns that they artificially inflate small 
differences and fail to adequately recognise absolute gains and persistent human capital gaps 
(World Bank 2020e), but also served to diffuse some of the criticisms levelled at the HCI by 
national governments in 2018.  
The design of the HCP and HCI, if not its implementation and reception, is suggestive of an 
attempt by the World Bank at governance through risk, writ large. The HCI calculates future 
productivity risks associated with human capital gaps so that the Bank can signal financial 
risks to potential investors and leverage their capital into creating political risks for the 
legitimacy of national governments. Whereas Beck, Douglas, and Foucault offer tools to 
think through the social, cultural, and governmental practices of imagining and dealing with 
social risk, the HCI appears to be a self-conscious attempt to wield calculations and 
predictions of risk in order to compel change by producing significant financial penalty and 
political upheaval when met with inaction.  
This overt instrumentalisation of financial and political risk sets the HCI apart from 
benchmarks that rely more heavily on risk to reputation (Kelley and Simmons 2019). 
Quantified risks are instead to be turned into financial pressures through tools such as 
downgraded sovereign bond ratings and other priced measures of creditworthiness in an 
approach more typical of reintermediation in the financial services sector. The World Bank’s 
pivot towards quantification and prediction to signal investor risk marks its own response to 
the shifting landscape of development finance and, similar to the work performed by credit 
rating agencies, leaders at the World Bank seek to price and manipulate risks to productivity.  
If governments are to avoid the threatened financial and political contagion, they must 
judiciously manage risks. To this end the Bank has produced a ‘HCI Compass’, a ‘living 
document’ that will be regularly updated and which offers a series of checklists that will 
guide governments in identifying and responding to the barriers they face for ‘nurturing’ 
human capital and improving national HCI scores (World Bank 2020a, 6). Risk management 
is therefore a key current running through the lifecycle of the HCP, from benchmark to policy 
intervention. This reflects a social risk approach that is prominent in the Bank’s poverty and 
social protection programming (Best 2013), but which in the HCP has been become part of a 
wider framework for governance that spans multiple scales of activity and combines 
individualised investments in human capital, associated judgements of risk, and the mediating 
capacities of the World Bank. 
 
Conclusion 
We have argued that the World Bank’s HCP and HCI signify a process of reintermediation 
for the Bank within global development amidst shifting landscapes for financing and 





indicator as a factor of economic productivity, and offering its expertise to support 
appropriate investments, the World Bank lays claim to epistemic authority in this area. In 
doing so it extends its role as the ‘Knowledge Bank’ for development (Kramarz and Momani 
2013). The Bank’s production and dissemination of its HCI benchmarking system then 
facilitates comparison and evaluation of nations in ways that place the blame for 
underdevelopment squarely upon their governments. The HCI measures populations 
according to states of preparation and maintenance for their human constituents; predicts 
future output based on current states, and compares that future to a scenario of high quality 
and low degradation. Framed in terms of this ‘human capital gap’, the issue becomes one of 
inadequate investment in preparing and maintaining the stock of human capital. HCI scores, 
and the financial and political risks they signal, are then used to justify intervention with a 
menu of policy options that promote responsibilisation for households and individuals. The 
World Bank has attempted to deploy other agencies of development financing – the 
International Monetary Fund and credit ratings agencies – to bolster its efforts, aiming to 
complement its Knowledge Bank role with that of custodian for sovereign credit. Through 
this the World Bank conceptually marries its concern with human capital to a global system 
for guiding and making financial investments, handily straddling its claims to expertise in 
these areas. 
Our examination of the HCP and HCI brings to the fore a number of important questions 
about the nature of global development in a world of growing influence for private finance. 
Drawing inspiration from work on the conceptualisation of social capital within the World 
Bank (Harriss 2002; Bebbington et al. 2004), future detailed research should examine the 
evolution of human capital as a concept within the World Bank, including the role of 
influential individuals such as Jim Yong Kim, during his time at the Bank. Research could 
shed light on the discussions that led up to the decision to remove country rankings from the 
2020 HCI, and whether the HCI has had government policy impacts that played out beyond 
our view in this analysis. The apparent shift we have observed in the Bank’s approach to 
global governance poses several further questions for closer study and theorising: How do the 
logics of ‘human capital’ percolate and translate within governments? To what extent do, and 
will, other actors from development and global finance, including the International Monetary 
Fund and credit ratings agencies, buy into this governance system? And how do these 
activities draw upon, subvert or bypass existing national and supranational policy-making 
processes and systems of governance? 
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Table 1. List of components and benchmarks used in the Human Capital Index 
Health Expected learning-adjusted 
years of school 
Child survival 
Adult survival rates – 
proportion of 15-year-olds 
surviving to the age of 60 
years. 
Benchmark: full survival to 
60 years 
 
Rates of stunting for 
children under the age of 5 
years 
Benchmark: full non-
stunting amongst children 
Number of years of 
schooling a child can expect 
to obtain by age 18 
Benchmark: completion of 
14 years of schooling by all 
children by age 18 
 
Scores from student testing 
programmes such as PISA 
Benchmark: performance 
against thresholds for 
advanced attainment set by 
testing bodies 
Child survival rates – 
proportion of children 
surviving to the age of 5 
years 
Benchmark: full survival to 
5 years 
 
Based on Kraay (2018). 
